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Abstract
Mobile phones reduce the cost of communicating with existing social contacts, but do
not eliminate frictions in forming new relationships. We report the findings of a two-
sided randomized control trial in central Tanzania, centered on the production and
distribution of a ”Yellow Pages” phone directory with contact information for local
enterprises. Enterprises randomly assigned to be listed in the directory receive more
business calls, make greater use of mobile money, and are more likely to employ work-
ers. There is evidence of positive spillovers, as both listed and unlisted enterprises in
treatment villages experience significant increases in sales relative to a pure control
group. Households randomly assigned to receive copies of the directory make greater
use their phones for farming, are more likely to rent land and hire labor, have lower
rates of crop failure, and sell crops for weakly higher prices. Willingness-to-pay to be
listed in future directories is significantly higher for treated enterprises.
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1 Introduction
The rapid diffusion of mobile phones represents one of the fastest and most comprehensive
technological transformations in human history (Comin and Mestieri, 2014). In the last
decade, economists have begun to document the implications of this transition. Early studies
show that mobile phones reduce search costs and facilitate arbitrage in agricultural markets
(Jensen, 2007; Aker, 2010); more recent analysis evaluates the effectiveness of phone-based
information services that push curated information to rural households (Aker, Ghosh and
Burrell, 2016). The existing literature does not emphasize the difference between the cost of
communicating with established contacts and the cost of searching for new contacts. This
is an important distinction.
For two people to communicate on a phone network, two criteria must be satisfied:
both parties must have access to a phone, and one must have the phone number of the
other. Under those conditions, communication is possible at a fraction of the pre-phone cost.
Access to a mobile phone does not reduce the cost of searching for the contact information
of unknown parties. When landline telephones first proliferated, they were accompanied
by complementary information services to facilitate search (Brooks, 1976). In the early
20th century this service was provided by switchboard operators. Operators were eventually
replaced by printed directories, information lines, and the web. At no point have large
populations used landline telephones without the benefit of a complementary service that
supplies contact information. Yet, that is how much of the world uses mobile phones.
This study asks two related questions. First, do households benefit from having access
to a “Yellow Pages” directory that contains contact information for nearby enterprises?
Second, do enterprises benefit from being listed in such a directory? If information frictions
prevent households from discovering and contacting enterprises, a directory should facilitate
more efficient search, and improve outcomes for both households and enterprises.
To address these questions, we conducted a two-sided randomized controlled trial
(RCT) in a rural area of central Tanzania. We began in 2014 by conducting a census of
all enterprises in eight sectors relevant to farming households. The census covered 1,494
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enterprises operating in 49 villages and cities in a roughly 5,000 square mile area. We
randomly selected roughly half of these enterprises to have their contact information included
in a printed phone book, which was organized by location and sector. At the beginning of
the next planting season, in December 2014 and January 2015, we distributed 3,290 printed
phone directories via community meetings in randomly selected villages. Because of the high
likelihood of spillovers through directory sharing, we randomized distribution at the village
level. The experiment ran for nearly one year, covering a full cycle of agricultural activities.1
We find that receiving a directory had an economically and statistically significant
impact on 17 of 45 outcomes examined for farming households. Compared to control house-
holds, recipients were 36% more likely to send mobile money and 20% more likely to receive
it, 22% more likely to order goods for delivery from outside their village, 75% more likely
to use their phone to source inputs, and 25% more likely to search for output prices outside
their village. They were 23% more likely to hire labor, 33% more likely to borrow or rent
farmland, and 27% less likely to experience a maize crop failure. Treated households were
59% more likely to run a non-farm enterprise from the household, suggesting that the direc-
tory influenced economic activity beyond the intended effects on farming. All results remain
significant after corrections for multiple testing within outcome categories.
We find a meaningful but imprecise effect on the prices received for selling crops.
Pooling sales of maize and sunflower, the two main cash crops, we find that treated house-
holds received 6.8% higher prices (p-value = 0.13). This result may be under-powered, as
the study year had little rainfall and only a small share of households sold any crops. Our
analysis uncovered no statistically significant impacts on crop inputs beyond land and labor
(e.g. fertilizer, pesticides, traction animals), no impacts on most dimensions of livestock ac-
tivity (sales, purchases, prices), and no impact on the extensive margin propensity to make
phone calls. Many of these null effects are on outcomes that exhibit little overall variation.
The benefits of the directory do not appear to be limited to certain types of house-
holds. Ex ante, we hypothesized that impacts would be larger in magnitude for women and
1Out of concern for the control enterprises, we broke the experiment after one year and re-distributed a
large number of directories with all enterprises listed. This was planned from the outset.
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for poorer recipients, because in this setting men and wealthy individuals are better able
to travel and gather phone numbers. We find no support for these hypotheses. Splitting
households into above/below median wealth groups, we do find that some impacts are only
statistically different from zero for one group. Yet, for all outcomes we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the treatment effects are the same. We find a similar pattern when we split
on gender. With 90% confidence, we can reject the null of equal average treatment effects
for men and women for only 3 out of 45 outcomes.
We also find economically and statistically significant impacts on 8 of 19 outcomes
examined for enterprises. Over four post-treatment surveys, listed enterprises received on
average 2.46 more business-related phone calls over the two most recent operating days, a
27% increase over the control mean of 9.11. Treated enterprises were 12% more likely to use
mobile money and 20% more likely to hire workers. For other enterprise outcomes—outgoing
communication, sales, and revenue—we find uniformly positive point estimates, but no sta-
tistically significant differences between treatment and control enterprises. The single-season
treatment may have been too short to detect impacts in these domains. However, further
analysis suggests that the estimated treatment effect is attenuated by positive spillovers to
the control group (the unlisted enterprises in villages where some other enterprises were
listed). Compared to a pure control group of firms from villages where no enterprises were
listed, both treatment and control enterprises enjoyed significant increases in the total num-
ber and total value of sales over the previous two operating days. The directory increased
the overall level of business activity in treated villages—likely mediated by initial phone calls
to treated enterprises—which improved outcomes even for the unlisted group.
After the RCT, we used an incentive compatible auction based on Becker, DeGroot
and Marschak (1964) to elicit local residents’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a copy of the
directory. Although we excluded previous directory recipients from the WTP experiment,
those living in places where we had distributed booklets in the RCT were willing to pay
substantially less. This is consistent with the widespread sharing of booklets documented in
our surveys, and the partially non-rival nature of the directory contents. We also measured
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the WTP of study enterprises to be listed in a hypothetical future directory printing, using
a stated preference approach. Owners of treated enterprises were willing to pay significantly
more than owners of control enteprises, who were themselves willing to pay weakly more
than owners of pure control enterprises. The experience of being listed clearly led to up-
ward revisions of enterprise owners’ prior valuation of the directory. Back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that printing directories and charging enterprises for a listing would be
a profitable exercise in central Tanzania.
Our findings advance multiple literatures. In classic search models (Stigler, 1961),
buyers canvas known sellers, incurring some marginal cost for acquiring information. Phones
lower this marginal cost, which in turn can facilitate arbitrage in agricultural markets, reduc-
ing price spreads and increasing total surplus (Jensen, 2007; Aker, 2010). Phone networks,
and the mobile money ecosystem they enable, have also reduced the cost of transferring
money, which in turn has increased resilience to shocks and reduced poverty (Jack and Suri,
2014; Suri and Jack, 2016; Blumenstock, Eagle and Fafchamps, 2016). But if the fixed cost
of acquiring the phone number of an unknown contact is sufficiently large, marginal costs
may be irrelevant. In this sense, contact information is qualitatively different from other
types of information.
A large body of work examines the way that contacts, and the networks that they
collectively form, influence agricultural outcomes in low-income countries. The literature has
generally found that networks facilitate learning about the availability and best use of new
agricultural technologies, although the effects are mixed in some settings (Foster and Rosen-
zweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010; Maertens,
2017; Cai, De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2015; Kondylis, Mueller and Zhu, 2014; Magruder, 2018).
Of course, contact information is only valuable if recipients make use of it. Relational con-
tracts are important when contract enforcement is incomplete (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000;
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002; Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004). Repeated interaction is
common in the rural markets of sub-Saharan Africa, where trading traditionally involves
cash-and-carry exchange with known agents (Fafchamps, 2004). At the outset of our study
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it was an open question whether recipients would trust the directory and venture beyond
their known and trusted partners. Clearly, many did.
Finally, this study advances the literature on small firms in developing countries.
The poor average performance and slow growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is
a persistent puzzle. Prior work emphasizes the importance of entry costs (Ayyagari, Beck
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2007) and access to finance (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; De Mel,
McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008, 2012) as factors influencing the firm size distribution. Other
evidence suggests that the average SME stands to gain substantially from changing how it
operates, either by switching technologies (Atkin et al., 2017), improving management prac-
tices (Bloom et al., 2013), or even keeping more change on hand (Beaman, Magruder and
Robinson, 2014). The findings of this paper suggest that the lack of marketing opportunities
is another important barrier. The directory listing acts like a form of advertising, in a setting
where marketing is almost exclusively word-of-mouth. In this respect our findings comple-
ment those of Jensen and Miller (2018). In India, Jensen and Miller find that the market
shares of high quality boat-builders increase at the expense of low quality builders, after
reductions in market segmentation driven by improved information access. If the directory
kickstarts a similar process among agricultural service providers in Tanzania, we may see
long-run changes in market structure, as consumers sort to higher quality enterprises.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background and context
for the study, details on the experimental design, and a description of the data. Section
3 provides the empriical framework. In Section 4 we present results, first for the listed
enterprises and then for the recipient households. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Background
Landline telephone systems spread through currently wealthy countries over a century ago.
Human switchboard operators were central to the early operation of landlines, and provided
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services beyond manually connecting two lines. Operators could steer traffic to particular
parties, or assist callers in finding a relevant business based on partial information (Barrett,
1935; Brooks, 1976). Printed telephone directories first appeared in the US in the late 1880s,
and operated alongside operators, although coverage varied across space (Shea, 2010). In
the first half of the 20th century, human operators were gradually replaced by automated
exchanges. Printed directories rose to prominence as the primary mechanism for searching
the network. In the last two decades, Internet-based directory services have largely replaced
printed directories in wealthy countries.
Mobile phones have proliferated more rapidly and comprehensively than did landlines.
Figure 1 shows the time path of mobile phone adoption from 2006–2015. Over that period,
the number of mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people in sub-Saharan Africa rose from
18 to 76. In Tanzania, the number of mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people rose from
0.3 to 77.2 over the period 2000-2018 (World Bank, 2020). The large majority of mobile
phones in rural areas are simple phones, not smartphones, although that is slowly changing
(GSMA, 2019). Landlines are available in major cities of Tanzania, but are used only by
government, wealthy households, and established formal sector businesses.
There is a printed directory available for landlines in Tanzania. It is not clear how
comprehensive it is, or how frequently it is updated. There is no directory of mobile phone
numbers. Mobile phone users change their numbers more often than landline users, and both
government employees and private sector workers tend to use their personal mobile lines for
work. It would be difficult to to generate a directory that associates phone numbers with
specific entities using only administrative data from phone companies. One implication of
the lack of directories is that most individuals’ phone-based networks are functions of their
face-to-face networks. People acquire contact information by first interacting in person, or
by following a thread through their face-to-face network.2
A diverse Information and Communications Technology (ICT) service sector has ma-
2If you ask a resident of a rural village in Tanzania to describe the process by which they would locate
the phone number of a business in a nearby town, as we have done many times, the response will invariably
involve personal travel, communication with prior contacts, or both.
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terialized alongside the mobile network. In the agriculture sector alone there were over 140
ICT-based services operating in low-income countries as of 2015 (Aker, Ghosh and Burrell,
2016), and more are added every year (GSMA, 2019). These services take a variety of forms,
including one-way provision of price or weather information via text message, interactive
voice response (IVR) systems for agricultural extension, smartphone apps to assist with
farm management, and others. The directory service in our experiment is different. Rather
than provide a specific type of farming-related information, the directory thickens the local
network and allows recipients to pursue whatever information they like. Our intervention
covers the fixed cost of acquiring contact information, lowering the marginal cost of future
communication with a wide range of agents.
2.2 The Kichabi Telephone Directory Experiment
The Kichabi Telephone Directory Experiment was a two-sided large-scale RCT designed to
measure the causal effects of a printed, enterprise-focused, mobile telephone directory on
both the enterprises listed in the directory and the households that received a copy of it.
Kichabi is short for kitabu cha biashara, or “business book” in Swahili. To develop and
distribute the directory, we partnered with the Institute of Rural Development Planning
(IRDP) in Dodoma, Tanzania. IRDP is well known in the area and lent credibility to our
interactions with residents and officials.
Our study took place in a geographically contiguous area in the Dodoma and Man-
yara regions of Tanzania, covering approximately 5,000 square miles in six districts. The
area is predominantly agricultural, with one cultivation season from roughly January to
May. The major crops are maize and sunflower. A range of enterprises provide services to
farmers, including formal enterprises like input supply shops, pharmacies, and large-scale
traders, and small informal enterprises such as households with milling machines, roadside
mechanics, bicycle transporters, and local retailers that buy and sell food crops. There is a
well-established system of ordering goods for delivery from outside the village, using local
buses for transport. Farmers can sell crops to traders who visit the village, at weekly mar-
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kets, or in nearby towns and cities. Physical inputs such as seeds and fertilizer are typically
acquired at weekly markets or at agricultural supply shops in large villages and cities.
Figure 2 provides the timeline for the experiment and surveys. In July–August 2014
we conducted an enterprise census in all large villages, defined as those with 4,000 or more
inhabitants in the 2012 national census, or that serve as the sub-district (ward) capital. We
also included the trading cities of Dodoma and Babati.3 The census covered 49 locations
in total. Enumerators systematically walked each location, inviting participation by the
owners of enterprises in eight sectors: wholesale trade, retail trade, transport, hiring/renting,
agricultural processing, skilled tradespeople, non-agricultural services, and financial services.
During the census we collected basic details only: enterprise name, location (subvillage
or neighborhood), sector, respondent name, phone number(s), number of employees, and
specialization details (e.g., traders could specify the crops they buy and sell). Enterprises
were offered no incentive to participate beyond the potential benefits from the directory
listing. A total of 1,506 owners enrolled their enterprise in the directory, out of approximately
2,100 that were invited.4 We did not formally track reasons for refusal, but a commonly
stated concern was potential exposure to tax authorities. After removing enterprises with
information missing, we retained a sample of 1,494 enterprises in 47 villages and 2 cities.
Enterprise treatment assignment took place in two stages. First, we randomly as-
signed 7 locations (5 villages and one neighborhood of each of the two cities) to a Pure
Control (PC) group. The 181 enterprises in the PC group were not listed in the experiment
directory. Next, we randomly assigned each subvillage-sector group of the remaining enter-
prises to treatment (65%) or control (35%), stratifying on village-sector.5 The 853 treated
enterprises were listed in the experiment directory; the 459 control enterprises were not.
Randomization at the subvillage-sector level ensured that neighboring competitors shared a
3Additional details about the study area are provided in Appendix A.
4A mix up in the tracking system prevents us from knowing the exact number of enterprises that refused
participation, as some enterprises in a few locations may have been approached and recorded separately by
multiple enumerators.
5A typical village in this part of Tanzania is divided into 2-4 subvillages, each with an administrative
office and sometimes a small cluster of commercial buildings such as kiosks and grain stores. Subvillages
may be separated from each other by a 10-30 minute walk. The two cities of Dodoma and Babati are also
divided into smaller administrative units that we refer to as neighborhoods.
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treatment status. We assigned clusters to the treatment with 0.65 probability to make the
directory as useful as possible for the recipients.6
We printed the Kichabi as a folded A4 size booklet (Figure 3). Enterprises are
listed alphabetically by village, sector, subvillage, and enterprise name. Figure 4 shows a
snapshot of entries from the villages Mnenia and Mondo. The primary phone number for
each enterprise is at right. The letter codes “A”, “T”, and “V” indicate mobile network
operators. If the enterprise has a second phone number it is listed in the description column.
In December 2014 and January 2015 we distributed 3,290 directories in 47 randomly
selected villages. We stratified by ward and by whether we had / had not conducted the
census in each village (which is almost equivalent to stratifying by ward and village size),
and selected one distribution village from each stratum.7 Randomization at the village
level was necessary because of the high likelihood of directory sharing. In each selected
village we held a community meeting, advertised in advance. We did not limit attendance
to farmers, although almost all residents of the study area are engaged in agriculture, and
we advertised the meetings as relevant to farming. During the meeting we introduced the
directory, demonstrated how to use it, and answered questions. We then distributed 70
copies of the directory to randomly selected attendants. We recorded the names and contact
information of those who attended the meeting, and noted who received the directories.8
In July–August 2015 we held a second set of distribution meetings in 34 new villages,
randomly selected using the strata that we had used for the previous December distribution.
We held these meetings in order to identify a control group sample for the recipient experi-
ment. The content of these meetings and the steps taken to recruit attendants were identical
6Throughout the study we were worried about the possibility of negative spillovers, if benefits to treated
enterprises came at the expense of control. We took numerous steps to monitor for and mitigate any negative
spillovers, including: creating a pure control group, treating more than half the sample, collecting multiple
follow-up surveys in a single season, and breaking the experiment after one year by distributing thousands
of complete directories that listed every enterprise.
7We excluded the cities of Dodoma and Babati for distribution of the experimental directories, because
the target popultion consisted of residents of rural towns and villages.
8In a few cases the meeting was attended by fewer than 70 people. In those cases, we asked representatives
of each subvillage to deliver the few remaining booklets to community members they believe would have been
most inclined to attend the meeting if held at a different time. We followed up a few days later to learn the
names and contact information of the individuals who received the directories in this way.
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to those used for experiment directory distribution. The only difference is that we did not
immediately distribute directories after the second set of meetings, because we wanted to
survey control recipients prior to distribution. Instead, we returned in December 2015 and
distributed the directories. The RCT was concluding at this point, so we distributed com-
plete directories that included all of the census enterprises. At that time we attempted to
distribute roughly 7,000 complete directories: one to every census enterprise, one to every
attendee at both sets of distribution meetings, and some extra copies to village leaders.9
While it would have been instructive to continute the RCT for a second agricultural cy-
cle, we had committed to re-distributing the full directory at the outset, to minimize any
long-term disadvantage to the control group in the event that the directory was effective.
In July–August 2016 we returned to the study area to experimentally measure the
distribution of willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the directory among a new group of potential
recipients. The WTP experiment served two purposes. The first was to estimate the revenue
that could be raised by selling directories, to inform public or private actors interested in
providing this service in the future. The second was to test whether WTP was lower for
those living in treated villages, where directories were already widely available (although past
recipients of directories were excluded from participating in these experiments). Any such
effect would be consistent with widespread sharing of directories and confirm the partially
non-rival nature of the information.
Stratifying on district, we selected 12 villages for the WTP study: six that we had not
previously visited (new villages), three where we had conducted the census and distributed
directories (large return villages), and three where we had only distributed directories (small
return villages).10 In each village we held two meetings with 30 respondents each, except in
one village where scheduling problems limited us to a single meeting. Prior directory recipi-
ents were not eligibile to participate. We worked with village leaders to recruit a broad swath
of participants, including female household heads, older people, heads of poor households,
9We sent text messages to everyone involved in the study, inviting them to come to the village office to
pick up their booklet on a specific day. If they did not show up, we left a copy for them with village leaders.
10There do not exist villages where we conducted the census but did not distribute directories. After the
2015 endline survey we gave a copy of the complete directory to every listed enterprises.
10
and individuals from every subvillage. The total sample consisted of 690 participants, 330
in return villages and 360 in new villages.
During the WTP meetings we administered a variant of the Becker, DeGroot, Marschak
(BDM) mechanism (Becker, DeGroot and Marschak, 1964). After an introduction to the
directory and a practice round, we revealed 10 possible directory prices, ranging from zero
to a price above the maximum observed during piloting. We then asked each participant to
write down on a slip of paper the maximum price that they would be willing to pay for the
directory on that same day.11 Participants were told that they would be given a few hours to
gather the cash. After responses were collected, one participant drew one of the ten prices
at random. Participants who had bid an amount greater than or equal to the drawn price
were allowed to buy the directory at the drawn price. The distribution of bids represents an
incentivize-compatible estimate of the distribution of maximum WTP for the directory.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
Data for our empirical analysis come from three survey efforts administered by our team.
Surveys were implented using the SurveyBe program on tablets running the Android oper-
ating system. For continuous variables, we designated a response as an outlier if it was more
than five standard deviations from the mean, and replaced those values with the median.
1. Enterprise Surveys. Our team conducted five rounds of surveys with the owner
or manager of 440 randomly selected study enterprises: baseline, midline, phone survey 1,
phone survey 2, and endline (Figure 2). The baseline occurred prior to the onset of treatment
(the distribution of the experiment directories); all other surveys took place after. We chose
to measure some outcomes four times post-treatment in order to improve precision on noisy
variables (McKenzie, 2012).
The baseline, midline, and endline surveys covered broadly similar topics, including
communication, mobile money, sales, revenue, and employment. These surveys were con-
11Seeing the list of possible prices in advance may have anchored some respondents on those options. We
piloted various approaches, and chose this one because the risk associated with some minor anchoring was
outweighed by the strong preference of participants to interact with a known set of possible prices.
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ducted in person by survey team members, at a time convenient for the respondent. The
baseline began in the second week of September 2014 and lasted for a little over a month.
The midline began in the third week of March 2015 and was 90% complete by the second
week of May. Nineteen respondents either could not be located or refused to participate in
the midline survey; we interviewed 18 replacements. The endline survey took place from
September–November 2015, with a three-week break in the middle to accommodate the
presidential election. We successfully reinterviewed 381 baseline respondents at endline. We
attributed the lower re-survey rate to the election. Tanzanians return to their home towns
to vote, and many enterprises were closed for an extended period to accommodate travel.
The two phone surveys were conducted from our team office at IRDP, in Dodoma.
Phone survey 1 ran from the last week of May through the second week of June, and phone
survey 2 began immediately after and ran for ten days. These surveys were timed to match
periods of peak activity in the agriculture sector. The survey was very short and focused
on one main outcome: the number of business-related phone calls received in the prior 2
business days. The goal was to improve precision of impact estimates on this key outcome
without the imposition of another lengthy survey. We reached 392 respondents during phone
survey 1 (89.1%), and 375 respondents during phone survey 2 (85.2%).12
Panel A of Table 1 contains baseline summary statistics for the surveyed enterprises.
Column 1 provides means for treated enterprises. Column 2 provides means for enterprises
assigned to control or pure control. Variables are grouped as follows (from top to bottom): re-
spondent characteristics, general enterprise characteristics, employment, sales/revenue, and
communication. To justify the interpretation of our estimation results as causal effects, we
verify random assignment by separately regressing each variable in Panel A of Table 1 on a
treatment indicator and stratification dummy variables. Column 4 reports the p-values on
the treatment dummy from those regressions. Only one estimate is statistically significant
at baseline, in the equation for the number of business calls received. This single depar-
12Response rates would likely have been higher if we had been able to extend the survey duration. A prior
mobile phone survey in Tanzania had average response rates over 96%, but required consistent follow-up to
accommodate respondents’ changing availability (Dillon, 2012).
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ture from balance is well within the expected range from random chance. Unfortunately, it
happens to be present for our primary outcome variable. We use an analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) estimation strategy that controls for this baseline imbalance (Section 3.1).
The baseline survey took place during the slow time of year for agriculture-related
enterprises. At baseline the mean treatment (control) enterprise received 6.55 (6.86) business-
related phone calls over the previous week. In the four post-treatment surveys we narrowed
the recall period to the previous two business days, in anticipation of a seasonal uptick
in calling activity and potentially large treatment effects. Figure 5 shows the scatter plot
and a non-parametric regression of incoming call volume over time. The increase in phone
activity during March–June 2015 is related to the ongoing cultivation, harvest, and marketing
periods, the busiest times of year for many study enterprises.
The four communication outcomes in the lowest section of Panel A have the lowest
response rates (Column 3, Table 1). Almost all of the non-responses for these variables are
coded as “Not applicable (NA).” It is possible that many of these would be better coded
as “0,” to acknowledge that these forms of communication are rare but not theoretically
impossible. The “NA” response rates are similar for treatment and control enterprises, and
the only difference for balance is that the statistically significant difference for incoming
business calls is not significant if we recode “NA” as “0” (the revised p-value is 0.13).
During the endline survey we elicited enterprise WTP to be listed in future direc-
tories, using a contingent valuation approach.13 Enumerators read a standardize script de-
scribing a hypothetical distribution of 100 directories per location in 50 nearby locations
that had not previously received directories. They then asked a series of yes/no ques-
tions about willingness-to-pay X TSH to be listed in the hypothetical directory, where
X ∈ {0, 2000, 5000, 10000, 15000, 20000}. Like the WTP experiment, the goals were twofold:
first to estimate average WTP, to inform future programs, and second to test whether WTP
was affected by prior treatment. A positive (negative) treatment effect on enterprise WTP
13It was not possible to elicit enterprise WTP using a real-stakes experimental design like that used for
households. Doing so would have required that we follow through and re-print directories listing only those
enterprises that successfully bid to be listed, which would have conflicted with other study aims and taken
us well beyond our budget.
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suggests that the value of the listing exceeded (fell short of) expectations. We surveyed an
additional 509 randomly selected new enterprise owners at endline, in addition to the 381
re-surveyed enterprises, to improve our estimate of the distribution of enterprise WTP.
In June–July of 2017 we conducted a final brief phone survey with all study enter-
prises. The goals were to determine whether phone numbers were still active three years
after our initial contact, and to ask whether enterprises were still operating. We reached
1,327 of 1,494 enterprises (88.8%) using one of the phone numbers collected during the 2014
census. Of the contacted enterprises, 1,263 were still in operation, representing 84.5% of all
enterprises and 95.2% of those that we reached.
2. Recipient Survey. We conducted a single post-treatment survey with the directory
recipients (treated villages) and planned directory recipients (control villages). Recipient
surveys were conducted in July–August 2015, 1–2 months after the harvest and 7–9 months
after distribution of the experiment directories. Surveys in control villages took place in
the days after the second set of distribution meetings. Surveys in treatment villages were
timed to coincide with the control surveys in the same stratum. We randomly selected 70
villages for the survey, stratifying on treatment status, ward, and village size. In each survey
village, 12 respondents were randomly selected from the lists of those who had received
the experiment directory (treatment villages) or who were scheduled to receive the complete
directory soon (control villages). We successfully completed 831 interviews, 423 in treatment
villages and 408 in control villages.
In addition to basic descriptive variables, the survey focused on primary outcomes re-
lated to using a mobile phone for search and contacting enterprises, and secondary outcomes
related to input use, production, crop sales, and household enterprises. Balance on the time
invariant (and slow-to-change) household characteristics is assessed with regressions similar
to those used for enterprises (Panel B, Table 1). Households characteristics are well balanced
across treatment and control, with the exceptions of gender and years in the village. We
have no hypothesis for why these two variables may have differentially influenced attendance
at the two sets of distribution meetings, and cannot rule out that these imbalances are an
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artifact of sampling.14 We include both variables as controls in all household regressions
(dropping them has no substantive effect on findings).
Control respondents have an average of 137.5 contacts stored in their phones. The
distribution is skewed, with the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles occurring at 45, 100, and
204 contacts. The literacy rates is high: 91 percent of respondents can read Swahili. There
are only 16 households in which no one can read Swahili.
3. WTP Experiment. The final analysis data set was gathered from the 690 partic-
ipants in the WTP experiments conducted in July–August 2016. Two types of data were
collected from this group. The first are the responses to a short survey administered be-
fore each meeting, covering basic descriptive variables, phone ownership and communication,
prior exposure to the Kichabi booklet, and measures of geographical remoteness. The sec-
ond data set consists of the bids made during the WTP elicitation experiment. We dropped
eleven households with missing survey or bid data for a final WTP sample size of 679. During
the last month, over half (51.4%) of the WTP participants had not placed a phone call to
someone outside the village, and 47.4% had not left the village. All but 21.5% have at least
one mobile phone in the household. Average WTP for a copy of the directory—which was
delivered later that same day, upon receipt of payment—was 836 Tanzania shillings (TSH),
equivalent to 0.38 US dollars (USD) at the July 2016 average exchange rate of 2,180 shillings
per dollar. Restricting attention to the 62% of participants who bid more than zero, average
WTP is 1,346 TSH. The maximim bid was 10,000 TSH.
14Although the treatment and control distribution meetings took place at different times of year, we
intentionally avoided the harvest period when scheduling the second set of meetings so that the opportunity
cost of time would be similar across recruitment periods.
15
3 Empirical Methods
3.1 Enterprise Outcomes
To estimate impacts on enterprise outcomes we follow McKenzie (2012) and employ the
following ANCOVA specification using the enterprise survey data:
Outcomeisr = α + βTreatis + γOutcomeis0 + δMis0 + λr + φs + isr (1)
where Outcomeisr is the value of the outcome for enterprise i in stratum s in round r, and
r = 1 . . . 4 for the midline, phone survey 1, phone survey 2, and endline, respectively; Treatis
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the enterprise is in the treatment group, and 0 otherwise;
Outcomeis0 is the baseline value of the dependent variable (set to zero if missing); Mis0 is an
indicator for whether the baseline value is missing; λr is a set of round dummy variables; φs
is a set of strata dummy variables; and isr is a statistical error term. For outcome variables
that were not collected at baseline, we estimate (1) without Outcomeis0.
15 Enterprises in the
pure control group are excluded from estimation of (1) because there is no within-stratum
variation in treatment for this group. With treatment randomization, the estimate of βˆ
from specification (1) is the average treatment effect (ATE) of the directory listing for the
population of enterprises in the study sectors willing to be listed in the Kichabi.
We estimate (1) for two types of enterprise outcomes. The first are communication
outcomes, specifically the number of incoming business-related phone calls, the number of
calls from new customers, and the number of missed calls. Missed calls are of interest
because they are often used as a request for a call-back (A calls B, but hangs up before B
is able to answer). The second set of outcomes includes measures of economic activity that
could be influenced by greater incoming communication from customers, such as outgoing
communication, mobile money, sales, employment, and revenue.
Positive spillovers to control enterprises could happen through two primary channels:
15The two outcomes not collected at baseline are the number of incoming business-related calls from new
customers, and the number of missed calls.
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Kichabi users could travel to a village because of a newly established relationship with a
treated enterprise, and encounter some control enterprises with whom they transact; or,
treated enterprises could directly channel new business to nearby control enterprises, either
via their own demand for intermediate inputs, or by referring callers to control enterprises for
items not in stock. Negative spillovers could occur if the directory diverts activity to treated
enterprises at the expense of the control group, rather than generating new business. To
estimate spillover effects, we use data from treatment, control, and pure control enterprises
to estimate the following OLS specification:
Outcomeikd = α + β1Treatikd + β2Controlikd + γOutcomeis0 + δMis0 + λr + ψkd + ikd (2)
where Outcomeikd is the value of the outcome for enterprise i in sector k and district d;
Controlikd is a binary variable for the control group; ψkd are district-sector fixed effects; and
other variables are as in equation (1). The excluded category is for the pure control group
enterprises, which are located in villages where no enterprises are listed. District-sector
effects are the lowest level of cross-sectional fixed effects that are identified.16 The estimate
of βˆ1 from specification (2) is the ATE of the directory listing relative to the pure control
group, and the estimate of βˆ2 is the average within-village spillover effect to the control
group. Positive values for βˆ1 in combination with negative values for βˆ2 would raise concerns
that benefits to the treatment group may have come at the expense of the control group.
Positive values of both βˆ1 and βˆ2 could indicate differential trends across villages, and would
also be consistent with positive within-village spillovers from the Kichabi.
To estimate average treatment effects on enterprise WTP for a future directory listing,
we estimate equation (2) with WTPikd as the dependent variable, but without including
round effects (λr) or variables from the baseline survey (Outcomeis0,Mis0), because enterprise
WTP was only collected at endline. These regressions include the additional 509 enterprises
that were interviewed once, at endline, to increase power for the WTP analysis.
16The second-stage randomization strata, which are subvillage-sector effects, cannot be included because
there is no variation in treatment status within those strata in the pure control villages.
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3.2 Recipient outcomes
Impacts on outcomes for directory recipients are estimated using the recipient survey data
and the following OLS specification:
Outcomejs = α + βTreatmentv + δXjs + φs + js (3)
where Outcomejs is the value of the outcome for household j in stratum s; the matrix Xjs
includes the two time invariant recipient characteristics that exhibited imbalance, gender
and number of years living in the village; φs is a set of strata dummy variables; and js
is a statistical error term. Because non-compliance is a possibility—due either to errors in
recording who received the directories in treated villages, or to individuals in the control
villages somehow gaining access to a directory—the estimate of βˆ from specification (3)
is the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of the directory for the population of rural households
who would attend a community meeting advertised as an opportunity to learn about an
information service for farming households.
We estimate (3) for two types of household outcomes. The first are communica-
tion outcomes related to phones or other linkages outside the village. The second category
includes agricultural choices, agricultural outcomes, and outcomes related to non-farm en-
terprises, all of which may be affected by the realized or expected change in search and
communication costs facilitated by the Kichabi.
We pre-specified two dimensions of potential heterogeneity in recipient treatment
effects.17 First, we posited that treatment effects would be larger for households with lower
levels of wealth, as they are less likely to travel and develop large phone networks, and hence
are less able than their wealthier counterparts to make productive use of a phone without a
complementary information service. Second, we hypothesized that treatment effects would
17This study was not formally pre-registered. However, our January 2014 proposal to the study’s pri-
mary funder, the BASIS innovation lab at UC Davis, is publicly available at the project page on the
BASIS website: https://basis.ucdavis.edu/project/communication-search-and-mobile-phones-a-telephone-
directory-intervention-tanzania. The initial proposal document includes a discussion of potential dimensions
of heterogeneous treatment effects for recipients, at the top of page 4. The two dimensions of heterogeneity
discussed in that document that can be analyzed in this study are those related to wealth and gender.
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be larger for female recipients than for male recipients, because men are more likely to travel
for trading purposes and hence can gather phone numbers more easily than women. Of the
831 directory recipients, 171 (20.6%) were women.
To estimate heterogeneous treatment effects on recipients, we estimate versions of
equation (3) that include a binary variable for above/below median wealth or for being a
male recipient, as well as an interaction between that variable and the treatment dummy. All
other variables are as in (3). Household wealth is measured as the first principal component
from a vector of household assets (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001).
To estimate the effects of treatment on recipient WTP we use the bid data from the
experiments conducted in 2016 and the following OLS specification:
WTPjmv = α + β1SmallReturnv + β2LargeReturnv +Xjmvγ + jmv (4)
where WTPjmv is the bid of participant i in meeting m in village v; SmallReturnv is
a dummy variable for villages in which directories were distributed, but which were not
represented in the census or the Kichabi ; LargeReturnv is a dummy variable for villages
where we conducted the census and delivered directories; Xjmv are participant characteristics
that might influence WTP ; and jmv is an error term. The group not represented with an
indicator variable in (4) are the new villages, where we had neither distributed directories nor
conducted the census. Under the assumptions that participants understood the experiment
and had no deceptive intentions, the bid values represent participants’ maximum WTP for
a copy of the directory. The estimate of βˆ1 is the ITT from living in a distribution village on
WTP, and the estimate of βˆ2 is the ITT from living in a census and distribution village on
WTP. Differences between these two coefficients represent variation in WTP for the directory
based on whether it contains information about enterprises in one’s own village, as well as
any differences in average WTP between residents of larger and smaller villages.
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3.3 Inference
In estimation tables based on the RCT we report standard errors clustered at the level of
treatment assignment (Abadie et al., 2017). In equations (1) and (2) that is the subvillage-
sector level. In equations (3) and (??) it is the village level. In equation (4), which uses
data from the WTP experiments administered after the RCT, we report standard errors
based on the wild cluster bootstrap of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). There were 23
village-meeting clusters in the WTP experiments, each with a distinct peer group, practice
round, and drawn price.
We estimate the main treatment effect equations (1) and (3) for a substantial number
of outcomes, most of which fall naturally into categories. To correct for any bias due to
multiple testing, we also report q-values (adjusted p-values) adjusted to control the false
discovery rate (FDR). The FDR is the share of null hypotheses incorrectly rejected due to
multiple testing (Simes, 1986; Benjamini, Yekutieli et al., 2001).
4 Results
4.1 Enterprise Treatment Effects
4.1.1 Average Treatment Effects on Enterprise Outcomes
Table 2 reports the treatment effect estimates of βˆ from equation (1). The table reports
coefficient estimates and standard errors (columns 1 and 2), p-values (column 3), q-values
for outcome categories denoted by boldface labels (column 4), sample size for each regression
(column 5), the control group mean (column 6), and the percentage difference from the
control mean represented by the estimated treatment effect (column 7). Sample sizes are
larger in Panel A because those outcomes were surveyed at midline, endline, and in the two
phone surveys, whereas outcomes in Panel B were surveyed at midline and endline only.18
18In Panel B of Table 2, sample size is lower for the mobile money, employment, and sales outcomes, because
we only asked about these outcomes for enterprises that were operating (some enterprises temporarily close
during slack periods). We asked about business communication even if the enterprise was temporarily closed,
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In Panel A, column (1), the first row reports that listed firms on average received
an additional 2.46 business-related phone calls over the previous two working days. This
represents a 27% increase over the control group mean of 9.11. Estimated effects on the
number of calls from new customers and the number of missed calls are smaller in magnitude
and not statistically significant.
If treated respondents intuited the study goals and exaggerated the number of incom-
ing calls, estimates in the first panel of Table 2 are biased upwards. Demand effects of this
nature are a common concern in experimental research based on survey outcomes (De Quidt,
Haushofer and Roth, 2018). As a verification step, enumerators asked respondents if they
could look through the phone history together. When the analysis is limited to the approx-
imately 75% of respondents who agreed to this at least once during the surveys, estimated
treatment effects are larger in magnitude (Panel A, “Phone History checked” sample). The
coefficient on number of incoming calls increases to 2.67 and is statistically significant (p-
value = 0.01). The effect on the number of missed calls increases almost fourfold, to 0.38,
and is statistically different from zero. These findings should not be interpreted as a form
of heterogeneity analysis, because we do not know the process that led respondents to agree
to having the phone history checked. Rather, the results for this subgroup provide assur-
ance that measurement error in the key outcome variables is not systematically correlated
with treatment assignment in a way that biases treatment effects upwards, at least on three
quarters of the sample.
Panel B of Table 2 reports impacts on other enterprise outcomes. Treated enterprises
are 8 percentage points (12%) more likely to use mobile money, and 11 percentage points
(21%) more likely to send outgoing mobile money transfers; both results are statistically
significant after correcting for multiple testing. Treated enterprises are 12 percentage points
(20%) more likely to have workers other than the owner, and 15 percentage points (51%)
more likely to have paid, non-family workers. Both results are significant before correcting
for multiple testing, with q-values of 0.103 and 0.137, respectively, after multiple testing
because Kichabi recipients may not have known which enterprises were on hiatus, and still called.
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adjustments. The estimated effects on other outcomes—outgoing calls, text messages, sales,
purchases, and revenue—are positive but imprecise.
4.1.2 Enterprise Spillover Effects
Table 3 reports the estimates βˆ1 and βˆ2 from equation (2). These coefficients represent the
average treatment effect (βˆ1) and spillover effect (βˆ2) relative to the pure control group. The
table reports estimates for the same set of outcomes as the main analysis in Table 2. There
are three main takeaways from Table 3. First, there are no negative and significant estimates
of spillover effects on control enterprises. The benefits to treated enterprises did not come at
the expense of neighboring enterprises in the same village. Second, the estimated treatment
effect (βˆ1) on the primary communication outcome—the number of incoming business-related
calls (Panel A, first row)—is similar in magnitude and statistical significance to its value in
Table 2, while the spillover estimate of βˆ2 for the same outcome is smaller in magnitude
and not statistically different from zero. This is not surprising, as we did not list control
enterprises in the experimental directory. Third, relative to the pure control enterprises, both
the treatment and control enterprises saw economically and statistically significant increases
in text messaging (SMS), use of mobile money, number of sales transactions, and sales
revenue (Panel B). The average two-day sales revenue of treatment and control enterprises
was approximately twice that of pure control enterprises. The Kichabi increased the level of
business activity in treated villages, generating benefits even for unlisted enterprises.
How do we interpret the statistically significant spillover effects on SMS messaging
and mobile money usage, but not on incoming business-related phone calls? Our many
discussions with study participants provide one interpretation. The norm in Tanzania is
that text messages are reserved for known contacts. Participants consistently stated that
they would prefer to first call a new Kichabi enterprise, and only use SMS once a relationship
was established. We suspect that spillovers occur either through increases in demand from
control enterprises mediated directly by treated enterprises, or through incidental encounters
that occur when Kichabi users travel to a village to transact with a newly established contact
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from the treatment group. In either case, a connection with a control enterprise can be formed
without an initial phone call. Ensuing contact may then take place via SMS, leading to a
spillover effect on texting but not calling.
Our findings raise the possibility that negative spillovers may have occurred between
rather than within villages. The design does not allow us to determine whether the benefits
accruing to treatment and control enterprises came at the expense of the enterprises in
the pure control group. However, in mid-2017 we called all study enterprises to determine
whether they were still in operation. We reached 92.3% of the PC group, 90.7% of the control
group, and 87.1% of the treated group. Of the enterprises reached, we found the following
percentages still in operation: 95.8% for PC, 95.7% for control, and 94.8% for treatment.
Enterprise survival rates 1.5 years after the end of treatment are almost identical across study
arms. Although this analysis cannot rule out the possibility of between-village spillovers,
treatment only could have negatively affected the survival of pure control enterprises if their
counterfactual survival rates were greater than those of treated enterprises.
4.1.3 Average Treatment Effects on Enterprise WTP
Figure A2 in Appendix C shows demand curves estimated from the enterprise WTP responses
in the endline survey, separately for the treatment, control, and pure control enterprises.
Respondents selected their maximum WTP from a list, so these curves represent lower
bounds on the true demand curves. At all prices, demand is lowest among pure control
enterprises, followed by control and then treated enterprises. Mean willingness-to-pay across
all enterprises is 3621 TSH (1.72 USD). Among all groups there is positive demand even at
the high price of 20,000 TSH (9.17 USD) per listing.
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates from versions of equation (2) modified to suit the
cross-sectional nature of the WTP data. Column 1 shows that treatment increases enterprise
WTP by 789 TSH, or 23%, relative to the control and pure control groups. Column 2 confirms
the relationships implied by Figure A2: both treatment and control firms are willing to pay
more on average than pure control firms, although the control group effect is not statistically
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significant. We cannot reject equality of the coefficients on treat and control in column 2.
In column 3 we pool the treatment and control groups against the Pure Control group. On
average, location in a village with previously listed enterprises has a positive, economically
meaningful, and statistically significant impact on enterprise WTP.
Treatment led to an upward revision of the prior value placed on a listing by the
average treated enterprise. The smaller but positive effects for the control group indicate
a learning spillover. These effects are not driven by differences in trust that the survey
team would follow through on the hypothetical commitment to the printing, because all
respondents received a copy of the complete directory, with their enterprise listed, just before
their endline interviews. These WTP estimates confirm that the treatment effects reported
in Section 4.1 represent real and recognized improvements for the listed enterprises, validated
by their greater WTP for future participation.
4.1.4 Discussion of Enterprise Effects
The Kichabi led to large increases in incoming calls to listed enterprises. Using the estimated
treatment effect on incoming calls in Table 2, we can construct back-of-the-envelope estimates
of the total number of calls induced by the experiment. The main outcome variable measures
incoming calls over the previous two operating days. Hence, the treatment effect represents
an increase of 2.46/2 = 1.23 calls per day to each listed enterprise. A cautious estimate
of the duration of the enterprise study period is from February 1, 2015, to September 16,
2015, for a total of 228 days. In the baseline survey the mean number of operating days
per week is 6.22, which gives 228× (6.22/7) = 203 effective operating days on average. The
average listed enterprise received 203 × 1.23 = 250 more calls during this period than the
average control enterprise. With 853 listed enterprises, that amounts to 250×853 = 213, 250
additional phone calls. Because recipients shared the directories widely, we cannot assume
that this effect would scale linearly if we distributed more directories. Community members
were clearly quick to re-allocate the directories to those most likely to use them.
The absence of a positive effect on calls from new customers may seem to indicate that
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the directory enabled communication between previously acquainted parties. An alternative
interpretation is that directory users called Kichabi firms multiple times, and enterprise
owners would have only described the caller as “new” after the first call. The latter inter-
pretation is more consistent with our impressions from the fieldwork. Recipients tended to
treat the booklet as a source of entirely new information, and many enterprise owners said
that the Kichabi was bringing in new business.
Comparisons of outcomes between treatment and control enterprises indicate no sig-
nificant impacts on sales or revenue. This could be due to a lack of statistical power, to
the short time period of the study, or to a genuine lack of significant impacts. However, the
spillover analysis in Table 3 shows large, positive, statistically significant effects on both the
number of sales and total sales revenue for the treatment and control enterprises, relative
to the pure control. The most likely explanation for the null results in Table 2 is that the
Kichabi stimulated activity for both treatment and control enterprises, making it difficult to
detect differential effects within-village. This interpretation is strengthened by our analysis
of the effect of treatment on stated willingness-to-pay. Through their greater WTP, treat-
ment (and, to some extent, control) enterprises signal their positive impression of the effect
of a directory listing on enterprise performance.
4.2 Recipient Treatment Effects
We turn now to the recipient side of the Kichabi experiment. Over the study period, 27%
of recipients report contacting one or more enterprises in the directory. The average number
of calls to directory enterprises, among the callers, was 1.65.19 Almost three quarters of
recipients report sharing the directory with members of their household, and 43% report
sharing it with at least one person outside the household. In interviews, many recipients
described lending the directory to a friend who wanted it specifically for business or trading
activities. We did not survey these non-recipients. However, non-recipients must have made
19An implementation error during the recipient survey prevents us from knowing which specific enterprises
were contacted by each recipient.
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a large number of calls to listed enterprises, to generate the substantial treatment effects on
incoming calls reported in the previous subsection.
4.2.1 Intent-to-Treat Effects on Recipient Outcomes
1. Communication. Panel A of Table 5 reports ITT estimates of βˆ from specification
(3) for general communication outcomes. Treatment leads to an 11 percentage point (19%)
increase in the likelihood of sending an SMS message, an increase of 48 stored phone contacts
(35%),20 a 7 percentage point (20%) increase in the likelihood of receiving a mobile money
transfer, a 12 percentage point (36%) increases in the probability of sending mobile money,
a 6 percentage point (22%) increase in the likelihood of ordering goods for delivery from
outside the village, and an 8 percentage point (43%) increase in the likelihood of using the
phone to coordinate a delivery. Treated recipients spend 559 TSH (14%) more on phone
credit over the previous two weeks (credit is required to place calls or send texts), although
the p-value for a two-sided test of significance is 0.107. There is no extensive margin effect on
the likelihood of making at least one phone call, because there is almost no variation—96%
of control respondents made a phone call during the last two weeks. There are likewise no
impacts on the probability of receiving calls or SMS messages. Overall, the breadth and
variety of positive, significant effects suggests substantial pent-up demand for information
and communication beyond current networks.
2. Crop Production. Panel B of Table 5 reports ITT effects on crop-related choices
and outcomes.21 The first outcome listed is an index equal to 1 if the farmer used the phone
for any crop activity. Directory recipients are 11 percentage points (36%) more likely to use
their phone for crop-related activities. Recipients were significantly more likely to use their
phones for a wide range of crop activities: searching for inputs (10 percentage points; 75%
more likely), acquiring those inputs (9 p.p.; 53%), coordinating with buyers (5 p.p.; 99%),
20This finding is effectively unchanged if we limit the analysis to recipients who allowed the enumerator
to count the contacts.
21Most of the variables in this panel were only collected for maize and sunflower, the dominant local crops.
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and searching for output prices, conditional on conducting any output price search(10 p.p.;
61%). These effects remain statistically significant after corrections for multiple hypothesis
testing. Treated households were also 4 percentage points (44%) more likely to use the phone
to seek general agricultural advice (p-value=0.103). Anecdotal evidence suggests that such
advice was often sought from input suppliers or wholesale traders.
Treatment reduced the likelihood of a crop failure for maize by 7 percentage points
(27%) and for sunflower by 3 percentage points (23%), although the effect on sunflower is
not statistically different from zero. A possible mechanism for improved maize outcomes
is better access to inputs: treated recipients were 5 percentage points (33%) more likely to
borrow or rent land, and 12 percentage points (23%) more likely to hire labor. We find no
statistically significant differences on total input expenditure or on the extensive margin use
of other inputs, including fertilizer, pesticides, purchased seeds, and tractors or plow animals.
There is less variation in use of these inputs than for hired labor and rented land. Only 1
and 4 percent of control households use pesticides and fertilizer (respectively), while 91% use
tractors or plow animals and 92% purchase seeds. Treated farmers were not differentially
likely to search or source inputs from inside or outside the village.
Treated households were 13 percentage points (25%) more likely to search crop prices
outside their villages, conditional on searching. To analyze effects on the prices received, we
pool maize and sunflower sales and estimated the regression in logs, with controls for crop-
by-unit fixed effects.22 Receipt of the directory had a positive but imprecise effect on the
price received for crops. The point estimate indicates 7% higher prices for treated recipients,
with a p-value of 0.13. This finding is based on an unexpectedly small number of sales. The
study area experienced a severe drought during a critical period of crop growth in 2015.
Only 271 sales resulted from 1,427 plantings of maize or sunflower. Given the substantial
impacts on searching prices by phone and searching prices outside the village, it is possible
that in a more typical year we would see a statistically significant impact on prices.
22We adopted this strategy ex post, after seeing very few sales due to the bad weather year. Estimated
effects on crop sales price are not statistically significant if we examine crops individually.
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3. Livestock Production. Panel C of Table 5 shows ITT effects for the sale and
purchase of livestock. Most of these effects are conditioned on selling/buying or some other
behavior, and hence are estimated on smaller samples. There is no statistically significant
treatment effect for 7 of the 8 livestock outcomes. However, treated recipients who sold
cattle or goats were almost 200% more likely to use their phone to search sales prices. In
contrast, not a single farmer who bought cattle or goats reported using the phone to search
purchase prices. This pattern is reassuring in one sense: respondents’ willigness to report no
phone use for some activities suggests that the positive treatment effects on other outcomes
are not purely reflective of experimenter demand effects.
4. Non-farm Enterprises. In panel D of Table 5 we report ITT effects on non-
farm enterprises (NFEs) run by recipients. Treated households are 16 percentage points
(59%) more likely to run an NFE. Conditional on operating an NFE, recipients were not
differentially likely to purchase inputs or make sales. They were weakly more likely to use
their phones to acquire inputs (15% increase, p-value = 0.12).23
We have no other information about the NFEs opened by treated enterprises. Barriers
to entry are very low in some agriculture-related sectors, such as retail trade and transport,
and we suspect that most new NFE activities are in these areas. This finding reflects
a common theme from our discussions with residents of the study area. Small business
owners and potential entrepreneurs were extremely enthusiastic about both being listed in
and receiving a copy of the Kichabi. Although we designed the directory to serve farmers,
there is substantial overlap in the networks of farmers and of enterprises in related sectors.
Non-farm enterprise owners face high costs to travel and establish new contacts and trading
relationships. Entrepreneurs saw obtaining a copy of the directory as a low-cost avenue for
expanding their business networks and opening new enterprises.
23Control farmers were recruited about half a year after treated farmers, so one might be concerned that
the effect on NFE ownership reflects differential selection. However, if anything, this should work against us
finding a statistically significant treatment effect. Non-treated enterprise owners clamored to be listed in the
directory, and to receive a directory themselves. If this excitement affected enrollment in the study, it would
have made NFE owners more likely to attend the control village distribution meetings than the treatment
village meetings.
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4.2.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Recipient Outcomes
Before conducting the Kichabi experiment, we hypothesized that recipient treatment effects
would be larger for low wealth recipients and for women. Our analysis supports neither
hypothesis. In Table A1 of Appendix D we report estimates of heterogeneous treatment
effects for households above and below median wealth. We do find that some impacts are
only statistically significant for one group. For example, effects on using hired labor and
renting land are only significant for poorer households, while the point estimate on the
crop sale price is effectively zero for poorer households but large, positive, and statistically
significant for wealthier households. Yet, for all 45 outcomes we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the treatment effects are the same across wealth subgroups.
We find a similar pattern in our estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects by
recipient gender (Appendix D, Table A2). There are many outcomes for which the treatment
effect is statistically significant for one gender but not the other. In most of those cases the
t-statistic is larger in magnitude for men. This is likely an artifact of power, because there
are almost four times as many men as women in the sample. In only 3 out of 45 cases can
we can reject with 90% confidence the hypothesis that the treatment effects for men and
women are the same. This rejection rate is in line with expectations from random chance.
Moreover, the statistically different effects are not clustered on a group of related outcomes,
and do not lend themselves to obvious interpretation.
These analyses suggest that the directory had broad and statistically similar effects
across both the wealth and gender distribution of recipient households. If wealthy households
or men enjoy an advantage in formation of phone networks absent a directory, it is not so
substantial as to render the directory differentially effective for them.
4.2.3 Intent-to-Treat Effects on Recipient WTP
Figure A3 in Appendix C shows non-parametric demand curves estimated from participant
bids in the WTP experiments, separately by village status in the development and distri-
bution of the Kichabi. In the new villages, a small group of respondents exhibits extremely
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high willingness-to-pay: 5% of the sample are willing to pay 10,000 TSH, or almost $5,
for a copy. At all prices, quantity demanded is lowest in the large, return villages. These
are places where both experiment directories and complete directories were distributed, and
where enterprises are listed in the directory.
Table 6 reports coefficient estimates from equation (4). The point estimate for living
in a small, return village is negative, though it is not statistically significant (column 1).
Small, return villages are locations where Kichabi directories were previously distributed,
but which are not themselves represented in the directory. The point estimate for large,
return villages is −662.3 (p-value=0.07). This implies that the average resident of a large,
return village is willing-to-pay only 36.5% as much as the average resident of a new village.
The estimated coefficients are largely unchanged when we add controls for other participant
characteristics, in columns 2 and 3. The signs of the coefficients on the other characteristics
are in line with expectations: older (wealthier) participants exhibit lower (higher) average
conditional WTP, women are willing to pay weakly less than men, and those who have
previously seen the directory are willing to pay weakly less than those who have not.
The wide availability of directories for sharing likely played a role in reducing average
WTP in the large, return villages. These villages received the greatest number of booklets
during the re-distribution of complete directories in late 2015, because the owners of listed
enterprises received booklets, along with the 70 residents that had received the experimental
directories a year earlier). Many WTP participants reported never having previously seen the
Kichabi, and prior to the experiment they may not have known that booklets were available
from their neighbors. But the experiment involved a meeting attended by 30 village residents.
It was easy for participants in return villages to learn on the spot that many copies of the
booklets were circulating in the village. Of course, lower WTP in the large, return villages
may also be due to structural differences between the communities. Larger villages have
greater numbers of enterprises, and residents may have perceived lower benefits to acquiring
contact information for enterprises in other locations.
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4.2.4 Discussion of Recipient Effects
Receiving a Kichabi enriched the productive lives of farming households. Recipients were
substantially more likely to use their phones to communicate with agents outside the village.
The statistically significant effects suggest some clear stories. Treated farmers identified new
trading partners from outside their pre-existing networks, ordered more goods for delivery
to the village, and paid for those goods using mobile money. Receiving a directory during
the planting period must have changed expectations about future access to inputs or output
prices, because recipients were more likely to expand their farms through borrowing or
renting land, and were more likely to hire labor. These choices require outlays weeks or
months before the benefits are realized. Revisions to expectations were accurate in at least
one sense: in a bad year for crop production, agricultural outcomes were better for treated
farmers, as indicated by the lower rate of crop failure.
We do not know how the directory affected farm yields or profits. However, it is clear
that the Kichabi sparked new efforts at income diversification, by prompting the creation
of new non-farm enterprises. A lesson from this finding and from our many discussions in
the study area is that village residents do not see a distinct line between their agricultural
activities and other income-generating activities. Essentially everyone in the community
is somehow involved in farming. Households dial up and down their non-farm enterprise
investments based on changes in costs and opportunities, and some recipients saw the Kichabi
as a means to jumpstart a new productive activity.
The positive but marginally insignificant effect on crop sales prices is best understood
in relation to prior studies. It is widely believed that information asymmetries allow traders
to extract rents from farmers when negotiating over crop prices. Although direct evidence
of non-competitive pricing by traders is scant (Dillon and Dambro, 2017), perceptions of
trader rent extraction are widespread enough that many interventions have been launched
to improve farmers’ bargaining positions by providing them with market price information
via ICT. Muto and Yamano (2009) study the expansion of the mobile network in Uganda,
and find positive effects on farmer sales prices for some crops but not for others. Svensson and
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Yanagizawa (2009) find a similar pattern of effects from a radio-based price service in Uganda.
Neither of these studies can ensure random access to price information. Using propensity
score matching, Courtois and Subervie (2014) find positive effects of an SMS-based service on
prices received by farmers in Ghana. Yet, Hildebrandt et al. (2015) evaluate the exact same
service using an RCT, and find only a short-term positive effect on one crop, which disappears
in the second year of the study. This array of mixed and null results from sub-Saharan Africa
is similar to the evidence from other regions, where significant effects of targeted information
services on prices received by farmers have proved elusive (Aker, Ghosh and Burrell, 2016).
In this context, our marginally insignificant treatment effect of 7% is encouraging. If traders
are indeed earning rents due to information asymmetries, the Kichabi was the same as, or
more effective than, many programs focused solely on providing price information. Moreover,
the Kichabi effect is from a generalized intervention that provided contact details, rather
than a one-way push of market price data from a customized information system. If farmers
are able to use directory services to learn prices, while also benefitting in myriad other ways,
then complex interventions to curate and share specific, narrow types of information with
farmers may represent an inefficient use of public resources.
The results of the WTP experiment indicate that prior Kichabi exposure—defined
as living in a village where directories were previously distributed—reduces individual WTP
for a personal copy of the booklet. We find the opposite effect for enterprises, for whom
prior experience increases WTP for a future listing (Table 4). The directory plays a starkly
different role for the recipients and listed enterprises. In village communities where resource-
pooling is common and residents are unlikely to need the booklet full time, the information
in the directory is non-rival. The expected benefit to owning a booklet is decreasing in the
number of directories in circulation. In contrast, conditional on the directory effectively
generating new business for listed enterprises, the expected benefit to being listed is likely
to be increasing in the number of other enterprises listed in the directory. If the Kichabi is
widely used, failure to list one’s enterprise could lead to long-term competitive disadvantage.
The differential cost to enterprises and recipients from “missing out” on the directory is one
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of the reasons that phonebooks for landlines typically charge businesses to advertise, but
distribute copies to consumers for free.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we evaluate the effects of a telephone directory for the mobile phone network,
Kichabi, on listed enterprises and recipient households. The directory was designed, printed,
and distributed by our team, in a rural, geographically contiguous area of central Tanzania.
We find evidence of substantial pent-up demand for communication. Relative to unlisted
enterprises in the same villages, the Kichabi led to a 27% increase in incoming calls for
listed enterprises, greater use of mobile money, and a higher likelihood of having workers
other than the owner. Unlisted enterprises enjoyed positive spillovers if they were located
in villages with treated enterprises. Compared to a pure control group, both treatment
and control enterprises saw increases in the number of sales transactions and total sales
revenue, likely due to increases in foot traffic to the villages listed in the Kichabi. Owners of
treated enterprises indicated greater willingness-to-pay for a future listing, consistent with
their perception of positive benefits.
Kichabi recipients also enjoyed substantial benefits. Treated households made greater
use of their phones for farming purposes, were more likely to rent land and hire labor, had
lower rates of maize crop failure, and enjoyed weakly higher sales prices. They ordered
more goods for delivery from outside the village, and made greater use of mobile money.
In an incentivized experiment conducted after the end of the RCT, nearly two thirds of
non-recipient participants were willing to pay a positive amount for a directory. Residents of
previously treated villages were willing to pay less. Directories were shared widely in treated
villages, driving down individual WTP for a personal copy.
There are many reasons that markets may be slow to provide profitable goods or
services in rural areas of low-income countries. Yet, it reasonable to wonder why no one
is printing directories, given the apparent benefits and the high enterprise willingness to
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pay. In 2017 we put this question directly to executives of a major mobile network operator
in Tanzania. They cited the difficulty of associating phone numbers with specific business
entities, the uncertain returns to programming for rural areas, and limitations to their ca-
pacity for innovating in many dimensions simultaneously. In the absence of action by the
network operators, a start-up firm could gather contact information and issue directories.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that printing directories and charging enterprises
to be listed would be profitable in Tanzania, even with free distribution (see Appendix B for
details). Of course, it is possible that a private entrepreneur would enjoy less cooperation
from enterprise owners than we did. Our partnership with IRDP was helpful in building
confidence and gaining the support of community leaders. If a trusted public institution is
necessary to generate buy-in by enterprises, then directory services represent an important,
missing public good in low-income countries.
The idea motivating this study is that contact information is qualitatively different
from other types of information. The mobile phone revolution has prompted the creation
of many programs to gather and share carefully curated information related to agriculture,
health, finance, or other areas. Many of these programs are likely to be beneficial and
successful. Yet, it is possible that in the rush to create nuanced platforms for sharing
information that complements specific activities, the development community has overlooked
the importance of simply providing contact information. Such services have been ever-
present, and under-appreciated, for landlines. Residents of rural villages are savvy at seeking
out and making use of valuable information. Mobile phones have lowered the costs they
bear for communicating with known entities. Phonebooks represent a straightforward way
to enhance the value of phones, thicken local networks, and allow residents and businesses
to exchange whatever information they please.
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Figures
Figure 1: Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people, by region, 2006-2015
Notes: Source is the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2020). Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 2: Timeline of the Kichabi Telephone Directory Experiment
Notes: This figure shows a timeline for the primary Kichabi activities. The agricultural cultivation season runs from roughly
January to May. Planting can occur as early as December, and continue through February. Harvest typically occurs in May–
July. Not pictured is a follow-up survey activity conducted in July 2017, in which we called all enrolled enterprises to ask if
they were still in operation.
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Figure 3: The Kichabi Directory
Note: At left is the front cover with the Swahili title “Kitabu Cha Biashara,” or “business book.” At
right is a page from the directory.
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Kijiji-sekta au jina la biashara Kitongoji/mtaa Maelezo ya shughuli, sekta nyingine, au namba nyingine Namba ya simu
Kavindi Supplier Msikitini Jumla; mazao ya kilimu A 789032035
Mnunuzi na Muuzaji wa mihogo - Hija Msikitini Jumla; mazao ya biashara; mahindi V 757517853
Subira Group - Wauzaji wa miche ya miti na asali Msikitini A 787158359 A 787456754
MNENIA - Wafanyabiashara wa Rejareja
A Shop Msikitini Duka T 652625962
Genge la Mariam Msikitini Biashara ndogodogo T 714319223
Genge la Shangazi Msikitini Biashara ndogodogo A 684319959
Kidisa Bustani Msikitini Sokoni A 682264585
Maguo Shop Msikitini Duka; nafaka; A 783288699 T 717205419
Muuzaji wa Mbogamboga - Vudu Msikitini Biashara ndogodogo; viungo; matunda A 782776215
Salum Shop Msikitini Duka A 787011534
Yusuf Spare Shop Msikitini Duka; T 719996930 T 715634797
MONDO - Fundi
Fundi Cherehani - Jera Araa Kati Fundi cherehani A 788610072
Fundi Cherehani - Mama Mchungaji Araa Kati Fundi cherehani; A 681323267 A 685698421
Fundi Cherehani - Mama Zahara Araa Kati Fundi cherehani; T 659921925 A 785521659
Fundi Cherehani - Mbuvya Araa Kati Fundi cherehani A 783792680
Fundi Seremala - Juma Araa Kati Seremala A 652709925
King Embassy Welding Araa Kati Fundi mchando/mwashi; V 753322258 A 789408781
MONDO - Sekta Isiyo ya Kilimo
Mondo Dispensary Araa Kati Kituo cha afya/dispensari; V 763002154 A 788783740
Upendo Medics Shop Araa Kati Duka la madawa muhimu; T 652345656 A 782822105
MONDO - Usafirishaji
Bodaboda Kimoko Araa Kati Pikipiki/bodaboda A 782934591
Bodaboda Msomari Araa Kati Pikipiki/bodaboda A 683529395
Bodaboda Nuruh Araa Kati Pikipiki/bodaboda T 713000975
Mkokoteni wa Kukodi - Itaso Araa Kati Baiskeli/guta; nafaka A 657314225
Mkokoteni wa Kukodi - Mtambalale Araa Kati Mikono/tolori A 688233312
Mkokoteni wa Kukodi - Mwamba Pampuka Mikono/tolori A 654577436
Mwalimu Mkokoteni wa Kukodi Araa Kati Gari/malori T 712567622
Mwenda Transporters Araa Kati Gari/malori; nafaka A 657848923
MONDO - Wafanyabiashara wa Jumla
Fundi Seremala - Maliselino Daki Juu Biashara ya mazao ya misitu T 718058152
Mnunuzi na Muuzaji wa Mazao ya Kilimo - Nfuko Araa Kati Jumla; nafaka A 788610173
MONDO - Wafanyabiashara wa Rejareja
Machine ya Kukamua Mafuta ya Alizeti - Mzee Gongo Ofisi Magharibi Mafuta ya kupikia A 783314812
Machine ya Kukamua Mafuta ya Alizeti - Said Ofisi Mashariki Mafuta ya kupikia; alizeti A 787199027
KELEMA - Sekta ya Kifedha
Makumba Shop Ofisi Mashariki Mobile money; A 783980869 A 787077622
Paranga Saccos Irendi Sacco; V 755893601 A 784797471
KELEMA - Usafirishaji
Jitegemee Trans Ofisi Mashariki Pikipiki/bodaboda A 783234612
Leta Nyau Trans Ofisi Mashariki Pikipiki/bodaboda A 782538230
KELEMA - Wafanyabiashara wa Jumla
Mnunuzi na Muuzaji wa Mazao ya Kilimo - Mohamed Ofisi Magharibi Mazao ya kilimu; nafaka; alizeti; ufuta A 788560151
KELEMA - Wafanyabiashara wa Rejareja
Chebe Kiosk Ofisi Mashariki Kioski; viungo; nafaka; V 752475525 A 782348852
Hussein Bucha Ofisi Mashariki Mifugo; nyama iliyochinjwa A 783521306
Issa Bucha Ofisi Mashariki Mifugo; nyama iliyochinjwa A 785065303
Kema Shop Ofisi Mashariki Duka; nafaka; maharage A 787199027
Mama Mpole Supply Ofisi Mashariki T 655571871 A 784561871
Mama Mwiru Kiosk Ofisi Mashariki Kioski A 686275312
Mnunuzi na Muuzaji wa Alizeti na Karanga - Sigara Irendi Mazao ya kilimo; alizeti; karanga T 652239170
Mnunuzi na Muuzaji wa Ng'ombe - Mdia Irendi Mifugo; kuku au kanga; ngo'mbe A 782599947
Zidane Kiosk Ofisi Mashariki Kioski A 788282744
KIBAYA - Fundi
Fundi  Simu - Asenga Kibaya Kati Fundi simu; A 689644104 V 767100404
Fundi Cherehani - Abuu Mafichoni Fundi cherehani T 655279003
Fundi Cherehani - Hashimu Kibaya Kati Fundi cherehani V 764466957
Fundi Cherehani - Mama Ado Kibaya Kati Fundi cherehani T 712151565
Fundi Pikipiki - Imma Kibaya Kati Fundi pikipiki A 686283272
Fundi Seremala - Fadhili Mafichoni Seremala; A 787838315 V 763585848
Fundi Seremala - Hussein Kibaya Kati Seremala A 787139033
Fundi Welding - Mohamed Mafichoni Fundi mchando/mwashi; A 789038296 A 785320300
Fundi Welding - Omari Kibaya Kati Fundi mchando/mwashi A 782933851
Geni Furniture Group - Mafundi Seremala Kibaya Kati Seremala; A 684039479 V 753481931
Mbaga Shoe Maker - Watengenezaji wa viatu Kibaya Kati V 769671073 A 684731253
Straggule Group Filling Station Kibaya Kati A 684451433
KIBAYA - Kuongezea Thamani Bidhaa za Kilimo
Kiteto Super Sunflower Oil Kibaya Kati Mafuta ya kupikia A 784111414
Figure 4: Example entries from the Kichabi experimental directory
Notes: Figure shows a snapshot from the printed Kichabi telephone directory. The columns from left to
right ar the enterprise name, sub-village o neighborhood, descript on field that allows for differentiation
and the listing of additional phone numbers, and the primary phone number with a letter code to indicate
the mobile network. The entries shown are a subset of those from the villages Mnenia and Mondo. The
first three rows are wholesalers from Mnenia (carried over from the previous directory page). The middle
group of entries are retailers in Mnenia, differentiated by the description field: Sokoni is “at the market,”
matunda indicates a specialty in selling fruit, Biashara ndogodogo is a “small business,” likely a kiosk. The
ondo entries shown are ll Fundi, skilled tradespeople, in subvillage Araa Kati. All three are tailors (Fundi
cherehani).
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Figure 5: Incoming Business-related Calls Per Day to Study Enterprises
Notes: Authors’ calculations from survey data. The horizontal axis shows the survey date, and the vertical
axis shows the number of incoming calls per day. Dots indicate each response, and lines show local polynomial
regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth set to one quarter the duration of each cluster of
interviews. The cluster of responses at left is for the baseline survey, the middle cluster is for the midline
and the two phone surveys, and the rightmost cluster is for the endline survey. Incoming calls greater than
20 (top 1%) are not shown, to improve readability.
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Table 1: Means of Enterprise and Household Characteristics at Baseline
Treatment Control N p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Enterprise characteristics
Interviewee is male (=1) 0.83 0.84 440 0.66
Interviewee age 38.16 38.51 440 0.83
Interviewee is owner (=1) 0.91 0.87 440 0.98
Single owner, is male (=1) 0.80 0.79 440 0.37
Mobile business (=1) 0.15 0.15 440 0.82
Business based at home (=1) 0.22 0.20 440 0.40
Electricity access (=1) 0.74 0.77 440 0.60
Days open per week 6.28 6.16 438 0.82
Family workers in last week (=1) 0.34 0.29 440 0.52
Num. family workers 0.53 0.49 440 0.51
Permanent workers in last week (=1) 0.18 0.23 440 0.54
Num. permanent workers 0.35 0.43 440 0.78
Temporary workers in last week (=1) 0.18 0.24 440 0.74
Num. temporary workers 0.58 0.76 439 0.62
Number of sales, last week 18.02 14.49 401 0.60
Made sales on credit, last week (=1) 0.41 0.41 440 0.99
Number of business purchases, last week 1.13 3.20 426 0.42
Sales revenue, last two days 1.5e+05 2.5e+05 422 0.50
Number of contacts in phone 172.21 189.47 410 0.94
Business calls received, last week 6.55 6.86 384 0.07*
Business calls made, last week 5.44 6.44 380 0.10
Business texts received, last week 1.75 1.91 338 0.39
Business texts sent, last week 1.41 1.66 326 0.29
Phone accesses internet (=1) 0.18 0.19 440 0.46
Use internet for business (=1) 0.09 0.10 440 0.53
Mobile money incoming, last week (=1) 0.34 0.42 440 0.55
Mobile money outgoing, last week (=1) 0.29 0.37 440 0.95
Panel B: Household characteristics
Age (years) 43.26 44.53 831 0.50
Male (=1) 0.85 0.74 831 0.02**
Years in village 32.32 30.58 831 0.09*
Household size (number of people) 6.02 6.17 831 0.83
Number of women age 15+ 1.62 1.67 831 0.64
Number of men age 15+ 1.67 1.62 827 0.53
Can read Swahili (=1) 0.92 0.90 831 0.44
Num. of other HH members who can read 3.10 3.20 830 0.47
Household connected to grid (=1) 0.10 0.08 831 0.54
Asset index 0.08 -0.08 798 0.56
Notes: Authors’ calculations from baseline survey with enterprises (Panel A) and post-treatment survey
with households (Panel B). Columns 1 and 2 are sample means. Column 4 reports the p-values on the
treatment dummy variable in regressions of each variable on a treatment dummy and randomization strata
fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the strata level. In Panel A, the control group includes both
control and pure control enterprises.
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Table 2: Average Treatment Effects for Listed Enterprises
Coeff. s.e. p-val q-val N
Control
mean
%
change
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Incoming Phone Calls (last two operating days)
Full Sample
Number of business calls received 2.46*** 0.86 0.004 0.013 1398 9.11 27.0
Number of calls from new customers 0.28 0.30 0.351 0.518 1276 2.56 11.0
Number of missed calls 0.10 0.16 0.518 0.518 1398 1.28 8.1
Phone History Checked
Number of business calls received 2.67*** 1.03 0.010 0.030 1063 8.83 30.3
Number of calls from new customers 0.25 0.36 0.482 0.482 977 2.49 10.1
Number of missed calls 0.38** 0.18 0.035 0.052 1064 1.12 34.4
Panel B. Other Communication and Business Outcomes
Communication (last two operating days)
Number of outgoing business calls 0.33 0.40 0.407 0.787 725 2.72 12.2
Number of incoming business SMS messages 0.05 0.18 0.784 0.787 726 1.43 3.4
Number of outgoing business SMS messages 0.06 0.21 0.787 0.787 726 1.20 4.8
Mobile Money (last month)
Use mobile money (=1) 0.08* 0.05 0.087 0.087 573 0.67 11.6
.... to receive payments (=1) 0.09* 0.05 0.060 0.087 573 0.57 15.9
.... to send payments (=1) 0.11** 0.06 0.045 0.087 573 0.54 20.5
Employment (last week)
Any workers besides owner (=1) 0.12** 0.05 0.026 0.103 574 0.60 19.4
Number of workers 0.44 0.29 0.131 0.174 574 1.36 32.4
Any paid, non-family workers (=1) 0.15* 0.08 0.069 0.137 574 0.30 51.3
Number of paid workers 0.22 0.22 0.320 0.320 574 0.86 26.0
Sales and Revenue (last two operating days)
Number of business purchases 0.37 0.57 0.521 0.690 573 0.80 46.0
Number of sales transactions 1.09 2.72 0.690 0.690 473 18.46 5.9
Sales revenues (TSH) 54037 119357 0.651 0.690 521 293860 18.4
Notes: Authors’ estimates from survey data. All regressions include fixed effects for survey round and
randomization strata, and regressions other than those for “new customers” and “missed calls” include a
control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. Outcomes in Panel A were measured four times
post-treatment (midline, phone survey 1, phone survey 2, and endline). The smaller sample size for the “new
customers” outcome is due to higher rates of respondents answering “I don’t know.” The “phone history
checked” sample in Panel A includes all respondents who allowed enumerators to confirm calls by looking
through the phone history together at least once during the study. Outcomes in Panel B were measured twice
post-treatment (midline and endline). In Panel B, sample size is lower for the mobile money, employment,
and sales outcomes, because we only asked about these outcomes for enterprises that were operating (some
enterprises temporarily close during slack periods). p-values are based on the standard errors reported in the
table, which are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. q-values are p-values corrected for multiple
hypothesis testing within categories, where categories are indicated by boldface headings. ***: significant
at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
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Table 3: Spillover Effects to Control Enterprises
Treat Control
Pure
Control
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e N mean
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Incoming Phone Calls (last two operating days)
Full Sample
Number of business calls received 1.92** 0.88 0.49 0.98 1576 9.19
Number of calls from new customers 0.32 0.33 0.11 0.36 1444 2.47
Number of missed calls 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15 1578 1.16
Phone History Checked
Number of business calls received 1.23 0.86 -0.70 0.99 1224 9.20
Number of calls from new customers 0.32 0.34 -0.02 0.38 1130 2.48
Number of missed calls 0.04 0.16 -0.09 0.16 1226 1.22
Panel B. Other Communication and Business Outcomes
Communication (last two operating days)
Number of outgoing business calls 0.77* 0.41 0.68 0.43 815 2.01
Number of incoming business SMS messages 0.53* 0.30 0.59* 0.32 818 1.00
Number of outgoing business SMS messages 0.41* 0.24 0.52* 0.28 818 0.75
Mobile Money (last month)
Use mobile money (=1) 0.16** 0.06 0.15** 0.07 648 0.57
.... to receive payments (=1) 0.19*** 0.06 0.15** 0.07 648 0.44
.... to send payments (=1) 0.14** 0.06 0.12 0.07 648 0.47
Employment (last week)
Any workers besides owner (=1) -0.05 0.08 -0.06 0.08 649 0.65
Number of workers -0.60 0.40 -0.63 0.40 649 1.88
Any paid, non-family workers (=1) 0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.07 649 0.37
Number of paid workers -0.42 0.37 -0.38 0.37 649 1.27
Sales and Revenue (last two operating days)
Number of business purchases -0.72 0.94 -0.92 0.89 648 1.39
Number of sales transactions 7.61*** 2.68 8.54** 3.59 529 10.61
Sales revenues (TSH) 149965***50164 128414* 75638 586 132998
Notes: Authors’ estimates from survey data. All regressions include fixed effects for survey round and
randomization strata, and regressions other than those for “new customers” and “missed calls” include a
control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. Outcomes in Panel A were measured four times
post-treatment (midline, phone survey 1, phone survey 2, and endline). The smaller sample size for the “new
customers” outcome is due to higher rates of respondents answering “I don’t know.” The “phone history
checked” sample in Panel A includes all respondents who allowed enumerators to confirm calls by looking
through the phone history together at least once during the study. Outcomes in Panel B were measured twice
post-treatment (midline and endline). In Panel B, sample size is lower for the mobile money, employment,
and sales outcomes, because we only asked about these outcomes for enterprises that were operating (some
enterprises temporarily close during slack periods). Standard errors clustered by subvillage-sector, the level
of treatment assignment. ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
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Table 4: Average Treatment and Spillover Effects on Enterprise WTP for a Future Listing
Dependent variable: WTP for a listing in a hypothetical re-print of the directory
(1) (2) (3)
Treat 789.4** 1023.7**
(386.9) (487.3)
Control 336.5
(534.9)
Treat or Control 814.3*
(460.4)
Mean of dependent var., excluded group 3380 2832 2832
Observations 881 881 881
R2 0.08 0.08 0.07
Fixed effects Dist-sector Dist-sector Dist-sector
Notes: Authors’ calculations from endline survey data. The excluded category is the Pure Control group.
Treated enterprises were listed in the trial directory; Control enterprises were in villages where some enter-
prises were listed, but were not themselves listed in the trial directory; Pure Control enterprises are in villages
where no enterprises were listed in the experimental directory. The dependent variable is the lower bound
on the interval containing the maximum WTP to be listed in a hypothetical printing and distribution of
new directories in new parts of the study area. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by subvillage-sector
(second level of treatment assignment). ***: significant at 0.01, **: significant at 0.05; *: significant at 0.1.
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Table 5: Intent-to-Treat Effects for Recipient Households
Coeff. s.e. p-val q-val N
Control
mean
%
change
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Communication and Extra-village Linkages (last two weeks, unless noted)
Outgoing communication
Made calls (=1) -0.02 0.02 0.217 0.217 738 0.96 -2.2
Sent SMS (=1) 0.11*** 0.03 0.002 0.004 738 0.60 18.7
Spending on phone credit (TSH) 559 342 0.107 0.142 786 4060 13.8
Number of contacts in phone, as of interview 47.95*** 11.35 0.000 0.000 683 137.51 34.9
Incoming communication
Received calls (=1) -0.01 0.02 0.652 0.652 738 0.97 -0.7
Received SMS (=1) 0.05 0.04 0.216 0.433 738 0.76 6.9
Mobile money
Sent mobile money (=1) 0.12*** 0.03 0.001 0.002 738 0.32 36.3
Received mobile money (=1) 0.07* 0.04 0.051 0.051 738 0.36 19.8
Ordering deliveries, recent agricultural season
Ordered goods from outside village (=1) 0.06* 0.03 0.052 0.052 831 0.26 22.4
Used phone to order goods (=1) 0.08** 0.03 0.022 0.044 831 0.18 42.7
Panel B. Crop Production (most recent agricultural season)
Phone use index
Any phone use for crops (=1) 0.11*** 0.04 0.007 0.007 831 0.31 35.8
Components of phone use index
Used phone to seek general ag advice (=1) 0.04 0.03 0.103 0.103 797 0.10 44.0
Used phone for input acquisition (=1) 0.09*** 0.03 0.004 0.011 776 0.18 52.6
Searched for inputs, phone (=1) 0.10*** 0.03 0.001 0.004 776 0.13 74.5
Used phone, output price search, if searched (=1) 0.10** 0.04 0.017 0.020 616 0.17 60.9
Used phone to coordinate with buyer (=1) 0.05** 0.02 0.017 0.020 677 0.05 99.0
Used phone to coordinate transport (=1) 0.01** 0.01 0.017 0.020 677 0.00 415.4
Crop failures
Maize crop failure (=1) -0.07** 0.03 0.038 0.075 743 0.27 -26.7
Sunflower crop failure (=1) -0.03 0.03 0.276 0.276 684 0.12 -23.3
Input usage
Fertilizer (=1) -0.01 0.02 0.615 0.717 776 0.04 -20.7
Borrowed or rented land (=1) 0.05** 0.02 0.022 0.076 776 0.16 33.4
Pesticides (=1) 0.01 0.01 0.402 0.595 776 0.01 74.2
Purchased seeds (=1) -0.01 0.02 0.799 0.799 776 0.92 -0.6
Tractors or plow animals (=1) 0.03 0.03 0.304 0.595 776 0.91 3.2
Hired labor (=1) 0.12*** 0.03 0.001 0.008 776 0.50 23.1
Total spending on inputs (TSH) -31107 38782 0.425 0.595 776 436167 -7.1
Input search
Actively searched for inputs (=1) 0.03 0.02 0.213 0.426 776 0.84 3.7
Searched for inputs, outside village (=1) -0.01 0.03 0.807 0.807 776 0.22 -3.5
Searched for inputs, within village (=1) 0.04 0.03 0.120 0.426 776 0.79 5.7
Sourced inputs from outside village (=1) 0.02 0.05 0.645 0.807 776 0.45 5.2
Output price
Log of crop sales price (TSH) 0.07 0.04 0.131 0.131 271 10.22 6.8
Output price search
Any output price search (=1) 0.04 0.04 0.350 0.350 776 0.74 5.2
Searched outside village, if any search (=1) 0.13** 0.05 0.010 0.020 616 0.50 25.1
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Table 5 (continued)
Coeff. s.e. p-val q-val N
Control
mean
%
change
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel C. Livestock Production (most recent agricultural season)
Livestock sales
Sold cattle or goats (=1) -0.04 0.03 0.175 0.270 831 0.20 -22.0
Searched for prices, cond. on selling (=1) 0.09 0.08 0.270 0.270 178 0.43 20.5
Used phone, sales price search, if searched (=1) 0.43*** 0.10 0.000 0.001 79 0.22 197.4
Log of livestock sales price (TSH) -0.09 0.07 0.211 0.270 87 10.68 -0.9
Livestock purchases
Bought cattle or goats (=1) 0.00 0.02 0.836 0.836 831 0.10 4.6
Searched for prices, cond. on buying (=1) 0.22 0.15 0.152 0.309 95 0.35 63.3
Used phone, purchase price search, if searched (=1) – – – – 37 0.00
Log of livestock purchase price (TSH) 0.20 0.16 0.206 0.309 95 11.42 1.8
Panel D. Non-farm Enterprises (most recent agricultural season, unless noted)
Has non-farm enterprise as of interview (=1) 0.16*** 0.04 0.000 0.000 829 0.28 58.8
Conditional on having business:
Purchased business inputs (=1) 0.00 0.04 0.998 0.998 297 0.87 0.0
Used phone to acquire inputs (=1) 0.09 0.06 0.117 0.235 297 0.63 14.9
Business made sales (=1) -0.03 0.04 0.535 0.714 297 0.91 -2.9
Notes: Authors’ estimates from a single round of post-treatment survey data. All regressions include strata fixed effects and
controls for two time invariant variables that exhibited some imbalance (gender and number of years in village). p-values are
based on the reported standard errors, which are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. q-values are p-values corrected
for multiple hypothesis testing within categories, where categories are indicated by boldface headings. ***: significant at 1%;
**: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity in Individual WTP for Directory, Incentivized Bids
Dependent variable: maximum WTP from BDM elicitation experiment
(1) (2) (3)
Small return village (distribution, no census) -251.35 -340.63 -303.64
(844.21) (516.75) (492.79)
Large return village (distribution, census) -662.32* -690.66 -766.27*
(375.24) (505.14) (465.20)
Previously seen directory booklet (=1) -291.76 -253.10
(222.40) (227.35)
Respondent is female (=1) -298.48 -288.19
(691.19) (601.48)
Age (years) -8.84* -6.76**
(5.04) (3.07)
Wealth (asset index value) 243.92** 206.62
(114.82) (141.25)
Mean of dependent variable, excluded group 1042 1057 1057
Observations 684 674 674
R2 0.02 0.05 0.08
Additional controls No No Yes
Notes: Authors’ estimates from incentivized willingness-to-pay experiment and associated survey data col-
lected in 2016. Small, return villages are those where we previously distributed directories for the RCT,
but which were not themselves represented in the directory. Large, return villages are those that had en-
terprises listed in the directory, and also received directories during distribution. (There are no locations
that were represented in the directory but did not receive distribution, because we distributed copies to
all listed enterprises at the end of 2015). The excluded village group consists of new villages, which were
randomly selected from the list of villages in the study area that were not involved in any aspect of the
RCT. “Additional controls” include dummy variables for primary occupation (farming, government, private
sector, self-employed, other) and education of household head. Standard errors are based on the wild cluster
bootstrap of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008), where individuals in a cluster are those that attended the
same experimental meeting. ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
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Appendices – For Online Publication Only
A Study Area and Enterprise Census
Figure A1 in Appendix C shows the study area, with the census towns and villages marked.
Dodoma, in the southwest corner, is the capital of Tanzania and the largest city in the study.
Other large towns include Kondoa, in the northwest; Kibaya, in the northeast; and Babati,
the only census town not shown on the map, which lies north of the northwest corner of the
map. The pictured region is roughly 8,000 square miles, with most villages in a 5,000 square
mile area. This is a region of semi-arid plains, with some lightly forested areas. There is one
rainy season, from January to May. Planting takes place from December to early February,
and harvest is from May to July. Maize and sunflower are the primary crops, and most
households plant additional crops such as beans, cassava, or potatoes.
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B Profitability of Enterprise Distribution
The goal of this section is to estimate the potential profitability of a printed directory service
provided by an entrepreneur in an area similar to our study area. Consider first the revenue
that could be raised by charging enterprises for a listing. Among the prices listed in the
stated preference willingness-to-pay procedure conducted as part of the enterprise endline
survey, the revenue-maximizing price is 5000 TSH for all subgroups (treatment, control, pure
control). If the target is to generate a directory with 1500 enterprises listed, total expected
revenue is 7,500,000 TSH.
Now consider the cost side. The pure control group is the appropriate reference group
for this exercise, as these enterprises had no experience with a directory listing at the time
that WTP was elicited. At a price of 5000 TSH per listing, 33 pure control enterprises out
of every 100 approached are willing to pay to enroll. In large villages and cities, a single
enumerator can approach 30 enterprises per average work day, for an average daily yield
of 10 enrolled enterprises. At this rate, 150 person-days would be required to enroll 1500
enterprises. The entrepreneur could avoid the cost of tablets and software by working with
paper notebooks to collect the basic details necessary for the census. A reasonable goal
is to print and distribute 2,000 copies of the directory. The lowest cost way to print the
directories would be for the entrepreneur to input the data at an internet cafe, outsource
the printing and copying to a stationary shop, and then staple the documents themselves.
If approximately 75 enterprises are listed on each side of each page (as in the Kichabi), 10
two-sided pages will suffice. A reasonable estimate is that it would cost 800,000 TSH to copy
10× 2000 = 20, 000 photocopies in central Tanzania in 2016. An additional 10 person-days
should be sufficient to prepare the pages for printing and staple/fold afterwards.
The question of profitability rests on whether 7, 500, 000−800, 000 = 6, 700, 000 TSH
is sufficient to cover both the full travel costs and the opportunity costs of time incurred by
the entrepreneur. Travel between large villages and cities is easily accomplished by buses.
It would be feasible to travel comfortably and frequently throughout the entire study area
at a cost of no more than 250, 000 TSH total. Time spent traveling would add work days.
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If we set the number of full days spent traveling to 20, reflecting our experience using buses
during fieldwork, the total person-day commitment is 180 days. This amounts to an average
daily return of 6, 450, 000/180 = 35, 555 TSH to cover the entrepreneur’s earnings and living
expenses.
Average daily earnings in the range of 36,000 TSH is similar to the average daily
wage earned by an experienced enumerator, with a bachelor’s degree, working for a research
firm in Tanzania. During periods away from home, that enumerator would also earn a per
diem. So the guaranteed salary and higher wage of an enumerator position likely dominates
running a directory start-up. Yet, for every applicant successfully hired as an enumerator,
dozens of other candidates are turned away. If the reservation expected wage is less than or
equal to 35,555 for any one of those individuals, or for someone else in the community with
the capacity to put together a directory, then the entire enterprise of directory provision
would be profitable.
There are many caveats to this back-of-the-envelope analysis. A creative entrepreneur
could likely find ways to cut costs (e.g., focus on cities and towns first) and increase rev-
enues (allow firms to advertise or bid to be listed first), either of which would increase the
expected profits. A small amount of additional experimentation may reveal that the revenue-
maximizing price is lower than 5000 TSH (in our WTP survey, the options jumped from 5000
TSH to 2000 TSH). On the other hand, an independent entrepreneur may have difficulty
convincing enterprise owners to share their information or pay for the service up front. It
seemed clear during our study that our relationship with the Institute of Rural Development
Planning was helpful in establishing trust.
Based on this analysis, we think it is highly likely that the expected earnings of a
directory start-up are above the reservation wage of many capable Tanzanian entrepreneurs,
as long as enterprise demand for listings is comparable to what we measured. If the latter
condition is not met, then directory production would be a profitable (or at least self-
financing) exercise for a trusted public institution.
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C Appendix Figures
Figure A1: Map of Study Area
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Table A1: Recipients: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, by Wealth
Below median wealth Above median wealth
Marginal
effect
Control
mean
Marginal
effect
Control
mean N
Difference
(3)-(1)
Difference
(p-val)
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Communication and Extra-village Linkages (last two weeks, unless noted)
Made calls (=1) -0.01 0.94 -0.03 0.97 738 -0.02 0.52
Sent SMS (=1) 0.10* 0.64 0.13*** 0.56 738 0.03 0.71
Spending on phone credit (TSH) 503.08 3112.56 334.04 5120.79 786 -169.05 0.84
Number of contacts in phone, as of interview 45.11*** 126.81 48.71*** 147.24 683 3.60 0.84
Received calls (=1) -0.02 0.97 0.00 0.98 738 0.02 0.30
Received SMS (=1) 0.10* 0.73 0.01 0.78 738 -0.09 0.20
Sent mobile money (=1) 0.11** 0.27 0.11** 0.38 738 0.01 0.94
Received mobile money (=1) 0.12** 0.29 0.01 0.42 738 -0.10 0.20
Ordered goods from outside village (=1) 0.03 0.26 0.08** 0.27 831 0.05 0.41
Used phone to order goods (=1) 0.04 0.18 0.11*** 0.17 831 0.08 0.20
Panel B. Crop Production (most recent agricultural season)
Any phone use for crops (=1) 0.12** 0.27 0.09* 0.35 831 -0.03 0.66
Used phone to seek general ag advice (=1) 0.06* 0.07 0.02 0.14 797 -0.04 0.33
Used phone for input acquisition (=1) 0.10** 0.15 0.08* 0.22 776 -0.02 0.73
Searched for inputs, phone (=1) 0.13*** 0.10 0.07* 0.17 776 -0.06 0.31
Used phone, output price search, if searched (=1) 0.10** 0.17 0.10* 0.17 616 -0.00 0.99
Used phone to coordinate with buyer (=1) 0.04 0.05 0.05* 0.05 677 0.02 0.62
Used phone to coordinate transport (=1) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 677 -0.00 0.97
Maize crop failure (=1) -0.04 0.26 -0.10** 0.28 743 -0.06 0.34
Sunflower crop failure (=1) -0.02 0.12 -0.04 0.12 684 -0.02 0.73
Fertilizer (=1) -0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.06 776 -0.02 0.56
Borrowed or rented land (=1) 0.07** 0.20 0.04 0.12 776 -0.03 0.59
Pesticides (=1) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 776 -0.01 0.42
Purchased seeds (=1) 0.01 0.90 -0.02 0.94 776 -0.03 0.50
Tractors or plow animals (=1) 0.00 0.90 0.05* 0.93 776 0.05 0.30
Hired labor (=1) 0.13** 0.38 0.07 0.63 776 -0.06 0.41
Total spending on inputs (TSH) -32795 288892 -61590 603188 776 -28794 0.75
Actively searched for inputs (=1) 0.00 0.84 0.05 0.84 776 0.05 0.43
Searched for inputs, outside village (=1) 0.04 0.21 -0.05 0.23 776 -0.09 0.20
Searched for inputs, within village (=1) 0.01 0.78 0.07* 0.79 776 0.06 0.37
Sourced inputs from outside village (=1) 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.51 776 0.01 0.95
Log of crop sales price (TSH) -0.01 10.08 0.12** 10.37 271 0.14 0.11
Any output price search (=1) 0.01 0.76 0.07 0.72 776 0.06 0.29
Searched outside village, if any search (=1) 0.13* 0.50 0.12* 0.50 616 -0.01 0.92
Panel C. Livestock Production (most recent agricultural season)
Sold cattle or goats (=1) -0.07* 0.10 -0.05 0.31 831 0.02 0.76
Searched for prices, cond. on selling (=1) 0.04 0.50 0.09 0.40 178 0.04 0.85
Used phone, sales price search, if searched (=1) 0.38 0.15 0.45** 0.25 79 0.07 0.84
Log of livestock sales price (TSH) -0.24 10.78 -0.07 10.64 87 0.17 0.55
Bought cattle or goats (=1) -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.15 831 0.03 0.51
Searched for prices, cond. on buying (=1) 0.06 0.45 0.27* 0.31 95 0.21 0.64
Used phone, purchase price search, if searched (=1) – – – – 37 –
Log of livestock purchase price (TSH) 0.71 10.98 0.05 11.59 95 -0.66 0.15
Panel D. Non-farm Enterprises (most recent agricultural season, unless noted)
Has non-farm enterprise as of interview (=1) 0.13** 0.28 0.19*** 0.28 829 0.06 0.44
Conditional on having business:
Purchased business inputs (=1) -0.02 0.87 0.01 0.87 297 0.03 0.75
Used phone to acquire inputs (=1) 0.04 0.67 0.16* 0.58 297 0.12 0.37
Business made sales (=1) -0.03 0.90 -0.03 0.92 297 0.00 0.98
Notes: Authors’ estimates from survey data. All regressions include strata fixed effects and controls for two time invariant
variables that exhibited some imbalance (gender and number of years in village). p-values are based on the reported standard
errors, which are clustered at the level of treatment assignment (the village). Column 7 is the p-value for a t-test of the
hypothesis that the coefficient on the interaction between treatment and above median wealth is statistically different from
zero. ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
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Table A2: Recipients: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, by Gender
Women Men
Marginal
effect
Control
mean
Marginal
effect
Control
mean N
Difference
(3)-(1)
Difference
(p-val)
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Communication and Extra-village Linkages (last two weeks, unless noted)
Made calls (=1) 0.05 0.91 -0.04** 0.97 738 -0.09 0.11
Sent SMS (=1) 0.10 0.61 0.12*** 0.60 738 0.02 0.83
Spending on phone credit (TSH) 752.09 2609.68 507.11 4535.92 786 -244.98 0.79
Number of contacts in phone, as of interview 48.60** 94.81 47.79*** 148.49 683 -0.82 0.97
Received calls (=1) 0.02 0.97 -0.01 0.97 738 -0.03 0.32
Received SMS (=1) -0.03 0.78 0.07 0.75 738 0.10 0.15
Sent mobile money (=1) 0.03 0.28 0.14*** 0.33 738 0.10 0.27
Received mobile money (=1) -0.06 0.36 0.10** 0.35 738 0.16* 0.07
Ordered goods from outside village (=1) 0.11 0.25 0.04 0.27 831 -0.07 0.38
Used phone to order goods (=1) 0.12* 0.17 0.06* 0.18 831 -0.06 0.41
Panel B. Crop Production (most recent agricultural season)
Any phone use for crops (=1) 0.09 0.21 0.12** 0.34 831 0.03 0.69
Used phone to seek general ag advice (=1) 0.10** 0.04 0.03 0.12 797 -0.07 0.18
Used phone for input acquisition (=1) 0.07 0.13 0.10*** 0.20 776 0.03 0.69
Searched for inputs, phone (=1) 0.10* 0.08 0.10*** 0.15 776 -0.00 0.96
Used phone, output price search, if searched (=1) -0.06 0.13 0.15*** 0.18 616 0.20*** 0.01
Used phone to coordinate with buyer (=1) 0.04 0.03 0.05** 0.05 677 0.00 0.96
Used phone to coordinate transport (=1) -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 677 0.02 0.14
Maize crop failure (=1) -0.10 0.32 -0.06 0.25 743 0.04 0.61
Sunflower crop failure (=1) -0.06 0.19 -0.02 0.10 684 0.04 0.66
Fertilizer (=1) 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.05 776 -0.05 0.25
Borrowed or rented land (=1) 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.17 776 -0.07 0.36
Pesticides (=1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 776 -0.00 0.97
Purchased seeds (=1) -0.01 0.90 -0.00 0.93 776 0.01 0.92
Tractors or plow animals (=1) 0.11* 0.82 0.01 0.94 776 -0.11* 0.08
Hired labor (=1) 0.23** 0.44 0.08** 0.52 776 -0.15 0.17
Total spending on inputs (TSH) 17719 294207 -44748 483818 776 -62468 0.55
Actively searched for inputs (=1) 0.05 0.81 0.03 0.85 776 -0.02 0.82
Searched for inputs, outside village (=1) -0.03 0.19 -0.00 0.23 776 0.03 0.64
Searched for inputs, within village (=1) 0.06 0.77 0.04 0.79 776 -0.03 0.77
Sourced inputs from outside village (=1) -0.05 0.40 0.04 0.47 776 0.10 0.37
Log of crop sales price (TSH) -0.01 9.92 0.09 10.30 271 0.09 0.31
Any output price search (=1) 0.06 0.74 0.03 0.74 776 -0.02 0.83
Searched outside village, if any search (=1) 0.01 0.49 0.16*** 0.50 616 0.15 0.16
Panel C. Livestock Production (most recent agricultural season)
Sold cattle or goats (=1) -0.10* 0.04 -0.03 0.12 831 0.07 0.25
Searched for prices, cond. on selling (=1) 0.08 0.60 0.09 0.40 178 0.01 0.97
Used phone, sales price search, if searched (=1) 1.01** 0.11 0.36** 0.25 79 -0.65 0.21
Log of livestock sales price (TSH) -0.20 10.40 -0.09 10.77 87 0.10 0.65
Bought cattle or goats (=1) 0.03 0.08 -0.00 0.10 831 -0.03 0.65
Searched for prices, cond. on buying (=1) 0.74** 0.22 0.10 0.39 95 -0.64 0.11
Used phone, purchase price search, if searched (=1) – – – – 37 –
Log of livestock purchase price (TSH) -0.35 11.47 0.33 11.41 95 0.68 0.23
Panel D. Non-farm Enterprises (most recent agricultural season, unless noted)
Has non-farm enterprise as of interview (=1) 0.23*** 0.36 0.14*** 0.25 829 -0.09 0.31
Conditional on having business:
Purchased business inputs (=1) -0.07 0.92 0.03 0.84 297 0.11 0.23
Used phone to acquire inputs (=1) 0.10 0.56 0.09 0.66 297 -0.01 0.91
Business made sales (=1) -0.01 0.95 -0.03 0.89 297 -0.02 0.76
Notes: Authors’ estimates from survey data. All regressions include strata fixed effects and controls for two time invariant
variables that exhibited some imbalance (gender and number of years in village). p-values are based on the reported standard
errors, which are clustered at the level of treatment assignment (the village). Column 7 is the p-value for a t-test of the hypothesis
that the coefficient on the interaction between treatment and gender is statistically different from zero. ***: significant at 1%;
**: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
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